Best Friendship and Pareidolia
Jan 14, 2026 | By Isaac Oberman DC ‘26
You can’t have more than one best friend; superlative comparisons do not allow for two people to be ‘best.’ If I do not consider a person to be my best friend, but they consider me their best friend, then categorically, we are not best friends. I am their best friend. We cannot enter into a unity of best friendship; can I remain their best friend?
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When someone asserts that someone else is their best friend, something changes. My theory for how this works builds upon a thought in my previous writing: Pareidolia. Scientifically, this is when we see faces in wall outlets, identifying patterns and faces in our surroundings. In my prior piece Crucifix Pareidolia,1 I defined pareidolia as the phenomenon in which mental assertions become our reality. My definition goes a little bit further by arguing that pareidolia reflects a deeper identity within an object’s essence and brings it to the forefront, creating a reality where once an identity is visually perceived, it tangibly becomes a part of our reality. When we see the face in the wall outlet, it is because the object has a concept of ‘face’ within it, and our perceiving it as such actually makes it, for our reality, a face. I think there is something related in the idea of best-friendship, and I will use a model and flowchart to explore this. We will consider two figures, A and B, and use the following flowchart to understand the different parts of the pareidolic process.
1. Declaration
As B asserts that A is their best friend, B voices a perception that they have of A. B’s perception of A informs A of B’s reality—the belief that A is their best friend. It is assumed that A does not consider B their best friend at this point because it has not been considered thus far. B’s assertion, however, opens A to the possibility that they could be best friends. In the pareidolic framework, where mental assertions can become a part of an individual’s reality, this allows A to consider an aspect of their relationship with B that was not previously considered. According to our model, if the assertion is never realized, best-friendship can never become reality. Pareidolia requires a mental assertion to become a reality.
2. Decision
Once A receives B’s assertion, A must choose whether or not to reciprocate. If so, they can enter into a best-friendship with B. B’s declaration opens A’s mind to the potential of best-friendship between A and B; A’s decision determines the outcome. This decision will either initiate the process of pareidolia or it will reject B’s assertion.
Best-friendship, being an exclusive relationship between two individuals, requires both parties to assert that the other is their best friend. B has already made the decision A now has to make; they have considered the possibility and allowed that possibility to become their reality. But it is not a shared reality until both individuals acquiesce to the covenant of exclusive best-friendship.
3. Pareidolia
Once A mentally reciprocates, the sublime mystery of pareidolia makes their perception reality. The second A joins in agreement with B on best-friendship, their relationship evolves into an arrangement where each sees the other within the new relationship that they have drawn, encircling just the two. Physically, nothing changes. Their title technically changes to Best Friend, but this is not commonly perceived. What is perceived is the sense of A and B, and A and B as within a new set. No longer are they [A] and [B], but [A,B].
The joint assertions allow both to coexist separately from others, manifesting a real sense of connection by themselves. This is the ‘pocket dimension of best friendship,’ created In science fiction, a pocket dimension is a miniature reality created by scientists, that is a collapsible reality that can be entered and exited.
Here, pareidolia has created a real space wherein both A and B are able to safely be. It is a physical manifestation of the best-friendship with another, wherein the party exists. It comes with great possibilities, and it calls upon both for its well-being. It is a space that enables a microcosm of new expression between them: vulnerability of emotions, personal jokes and stories, honest advice, mercy for their shortcomings, and a shared responsibility to maintain the pocket dimension. These responsibilities and privileges distinguish it from other associations, like a simple friendship or an acquaintance.
Part of the reason it can be difficult to agree to a best friendship is the realization that it is more than just a light association. The degree of intimacy between two individuals increases the responsibility individuals have towards each other. Someone who is just an acquaintance requires very little of us personally. A friend we might be willing to help, but only if it fits into our schedule or does not inconvenience us too much.
Best friends, however, call us to care for the pocket dimension, and everything within it, lest it fall apart. If we don’t exercise the best-friendship, it loses any meaningful distinction from a friendship. We must then be vulnerable, create in-jokes, and uplift the other. This is how the best-friendship survives and grows, thus continuing to deepen the expression and the exclusivity of that special union.
4. Loss
When somebody says they are our best friend, sometimes we don’t agree. If one of the two parties does not agree to the status of best friends, then it leads to an inequality. As we showed earlier, B has already made the pareidolic leap: they perceive A as their best friend, and for their subjective reality, A has become their best friend, even when in objective reality A is not their best friend until B is A’s best friend. But when A does not reciprocate, they remain outside of the covenant of best-friendship.
As a result of unreciprocated best-friendship, B suffers. It is difficult to un-consider somebody your best friend if they refuse to join the pocket dimension. Because best-friendship is no longer achievable, B must either choose to de-frame A as their best-friend and return to regular friendship, or choose to hold onto their new subjective reality and hope that A will change their mind. Both are painful. The first option puts B back down, and this established hierarchy defeats friendship. A is too good for B. Why should B even be their friend? Alternatively, B is stuck in a pocket dimension that they set up, but A never moved into. The maintenance of a best friendship requires two; B can only run around frantically propping up collapsing walls for so long. It’s a destructive cycle that will only end in B’s suffering.
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If, of three friends (A, B, and C), A should die, then B loses not only A but “A’s part in C,” while C loses not only A but “A’s part in B.” In each of my friends there is something that only some other friend can fully bring out. By myself I am not large enough to call the whole man into activity; I want other lights than my own to show all his facets. Now that Charles is dead, I shall never again see Ronald’s reaction to a specifically Caroline joke. Far from having more of Ronald, having him “to myself” now that Charles is away, I have less of Ronald. Hence, true Friendship is the least jealous of loves. Two friends delight to be joined by a third, and three by a fourth, if only the newcomer is qualified to become a real friend.
― C.S. Lewis, The Four Loves
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THE NECESSITY OF EXCLUSIVITY
If C.S. Lewis’s assertion that a component of one’s friendship is the experience of the friend as seen through the eyes of another friend is correct, it would seem that we can never truly have a best friend in an exclusive sense. The second I consider one person my best friend, we enter into a covenant with each other, a bond that binds us to each other. If I am ‘A’ and he is ‘B,’ then I am now defined as A and B’s part in A. The mental assertion I have made that B is my best friend is an exclusive bond; if we consider best as a superlative, then there can be only one other to define off of. A and B can be solely defined as a mixture of the two: A is A and B’s part in A. B is B and A’s part in B.
When we include a third, C, we now have a definition of each individual that contains three components: A, B’s part in A, C’s part in A, and so on. Friendship is multitudinous, growing in strength as more and more are added to the fold and draw out more of each individual. But best-friendship is built on an exclusive bond. Otherwise, there would be no ‘best’! By including a third and broadening the definition of each individual with an additional part from C, A is now defined as A, B’s part in A, and C’s part in A. The covenant of two is broken, and a new covenant of three is brokered.
There are three possibilities to consider. First, C.S. Lewis is wrong. Second, ‘best’ is not necessarily a superlative of exclusivity but of depth. Lastly, that best-friendship and friendship exist separately, and Lewis’ assertion applies only to friendship, leaving best-friendship to a different ruleset.
The first two ideas seem inaccurate and unhelpful. C.S. Lewis’ definition allows us to see how others leave lasting impressions, literal changes to an individual’s character that can be perceived by others. We cannot deny something that we perceive just because it does not fit into our system. The second implies that a best friendship is reliant on oneself and their perception of their friends, meaning whichever friend A has the strongest relationship with will be A’s best friend. However, we have already defined best-friendship as relying on two parties. If A considers B their deepest friend and thus their best friend, while B considers C and C considers A in the same way, then there are not 3 pairs of best friends but NO best friends.
Best-friendship is then a separate relationship with separate rules. Let’s build a model to analyze this. When A and B join in best-friendship, they become a unit that is defined as solely them: [A,B]. [A,B] is exclusive; it consists of only A and B, and it cannot allow any other points into its set. The pocket dimension has room for two. Including C would actually weaken the expression of A and B, seen in the following way.
Example
A has an emotional problem. B is their best friend. C is also their best friend. A goes to C, and C helps A resolve their emotional problem. A doesn’t tell B, as the issue is resolved through a private conversation. In a future discussion, C casually tells B about A’s problem. B is hurt that they did not get to exercise their function as best friend, nor even get informed about the problem. A and B are divided.
Cont.
We see in this example how [A,B,C] leads to issues. I am addressing this as the practicality issue. Some relational interactions are designed for two people. Vulnerability is a good example; being vulnerable is safest when there is only one other deeply trusted person present. When it is solely [A,B], A and B both know how to engage. They know their roles and responsibilities to each other. When C is introduced with the same roles and responsibilities of a best friend, there are now two possible outlets instead of one. When considering the practice of vulnerability, two possible issues arise. First, vulnerability is diminished by a lessening of the security of confidential therapy. The seriousness of confession is lessened by the inclusion of another, removing privacy and closeness from sacred exchanged words between two. Secondly, one of the individuals is excluded to their detriment. A best friend who doesn’t get to help their best friend is excluded: a separation with. [A,B,C] tends towards [A,B],[A,C],[B,C]; which is not an equal statement! We have already shown that best-friendship is exclusive, but only to those outside of it. If there are divisions within a best-friendship, it no longer breeds closeness but division.
In this way, a third within a best-friendship [A,B,C] is unstable and decays into the stable [A,B] and [C]. It actually strengthens A, B, and even C if A and B are exclusive best friends! By excluding C, C is free to pursue a best-friendship with someone who can do for them what A and B do for each other. Neither A, B, nor C has to accept the worse care that comes from sharing the responsibilities of the best friendship, receiving the benefit of the other unparsed. This is not to say that A, B, and C cannot be simply friends, and even then receive benefits from each other. The benefits of simple friendship are many, and are not lessened by additional members. However, the structure of exclusivity for specific actions, such as vulnerability, necessitates exclusive best-friendship. The covenantal structure even motivates individual development and a closeness that is otherwise unavailable through regular friendship.
[1] For a deeper investigation of the pareidolic process, find Crucifix Pareidolia on The Logos website.